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 The Regional Power Balance and Potential Hotspots*
von
Frank Umbach
in:
Panorama: Insights into Southeast Asian and European Affairs 1/2000, S. 53-82
(a series of occasional papers published by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s “Regional
Programme for Southeast Asia”)
Abstract/Summary: The article looks at two strategic hotspots in East Asia from a European
perspective. The author argues that a violent conflict in the Taiwan Strait or in the South
China Sea might have economic and security implications not only for the region itself, but
also globally, including for Europe. In his opinion, it is time to define Europe’s strategic and
security interests in the region as going beyond the present limited functional involvement in
support of KEDO and multilateral security meetings such as ARF and CSCAP. His analysis
provides an overview what happened during the last years concerning these two potential
hotspots and to which extent a „shifting balance of power forces“ as well as its implications
for regional stability and security can be identified.
Generally speaking, overall strategic trends in the Asia-Pacific region have been positive in
many respects. The region’s recovery from the Asian economic crisis has made visible
progress, particularly in South Korea and Thailand. These states have taken initial steps to
rebuild prosperous economies in a global competitive environment. These first steps,
however, are only part of a longer and deeper socio-economic transformation which will only
be successful at the end when transformation strategies are supplemented by coherent political
reform processes aiming at the establishment of genuine democracies and pluralist societies.
In this regard, the verdict on the longer-term sustainability of the present recovery is still open.
Moreover, major security conflicts are still unresolved or have raised new instabilities
throughout the entire region since the early 1990s, such as the present Taiwan Strait conflict.
At the same time, the region stands at the precipice of an unprecedented arms race, fuelled by
unprecedented economic growth and an increasing globalisation of security policies and partly
driven by interregional and global dual-use technology transfers.1 But in contrast to Europe
and the Soviet-American strategic relationship in the Cold War, arms control policies
continue to rank low on East Asia’s agenda. Furthermore, East Asia’s future strategic
configuration will be determined by the changing norms of the international system, the
revolution in military affairs (RMA), preoccupation of the major powers with their own
domestic problems, accelerating trends of democratisation (with implications on foreign
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 policies) and spread of market economies, increasing intra- and interregional
interdependencies (both economic and political) and the impact of the 1997/98 financial and
economic crisis on domestic and external security.
European Perspective
From a European point of view, it is important to recall that armed conflict in the Taiwan
Strait, or in the South China Sea could have not only regional but global economic and
security implications. Any unpredictable dynamics of escalation of these three potential
conflicts and hotspots might lead to inevitable unknowns about the extent, duration, and
intensity of those confrontations. Unless carefully managed, conflicts in those two theatres
have the potential to flare and escalate even into global conflicts. Given the complex and
rapidly changing nature of East Asia’s strategic chessboard, crisis and conflict prevention
have become urgent requirements for East Asia in the years to come.
In this context, given the increasing “globalization of security policies” and acknowledging
that present policies have not translated into real European influence in the Asia-Pacific
region – and have particularly failed to do so at times of crisis and conflict - Europe and the
EU should recognize the imperative to play a more substantial role. This could include the
launching of a strategic dialogue with China and Taiwan about the consequences of an
unprovoked attack or conflict. The unavoidable globalisation of both economic and security
policies compels Europe – together with the US. and Japan – to shoulder a greater diplomatic
and political burden than it has in the past.
The following analysis provides an overview of recent developments with regard to these two
potential hotspots: the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The various regional security
implications of the Indonesian crisis and East Timor for the region, however, are not treated in
a separate section, but they have been taken into account in the last chapter dealing with the
perspectives of a shifting balance of power in East Asia.
New Escalations in the Taiwan Strait?
Recently increased tension between China and Taiwan in the run-up to Taiwan’s presidential
elections on March 18, 2000 have once again emphasised one of the region’s major security
risks.2 Contrasting with its response to the 1996 presidential elections, however, Beijing this
time chose to use words to impress Taiwanese candidates and voters rather than missile tests
and large-scale manoeuvres in the waters surrounding the island republic. This change of
mind could be explained by the fact that Beijing needs U.S. congressional approval to go
ahead with its WTO accession. But different statements from the PRC Foreign Ministry,
political circles and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might be explained in two different
ways: First, it could indicate a lack of clear leadership at the top of President Jiang Zemin’s
government, leaving policy on the sensitive Taiwan issue to be settled among hawks and
doves. In this case, the doves would have prevailed, because rhetoric notwithstanding,
Beijing’s policies have been mostly reactive. Secondly, differing statements made prior to the
Taiwanese presidential elections could reflect a division of labour rather than a division of
views. However, the PLA was not alone in playing the “bad guy”. Even Prime Minister Zhu
Rongji himself came across as a hard-liner when declaring that the Chinese nation was ready
to ”use all their blood” to prevent the island’s independence.3 To adequately analyse these
developments, one would probably have to combine both explanations for analysing the
development before the Taiwanese elections. Moreover, Beijing’s general hard-line policy vis-
 à-vis Taiwan is at least partially an attempt to divert popular attention away from its own
growing domestic problems4 and to channel an assertive and xenophobic variety of
nationalism.
China’s “White Paper” on Taiwan, issued on February 21, 20005 and thus meant to intimidate
Taiwanese voters, was also confusing for foreign observers but could be interpreted as a
compromise between hard-line and soft-line fractions in the party. On the one hand, the paper
sent a clear message: China would attack Taiwan (1) if the island declared independence, (2)
if it was occupied by a foreign power or, (3) establishing a new linkage, if Taiwan indefinitely
refused to enter into negotiations on reunification. On the other hand, however, Beijing
appeared to agree to one of Taipei’s main conditions for political talks with China, namely
that Taiwan be treated as an equal and not as a “local government”. The White Paper refers to
this principle of equality no less than five times. Overall, however, the policy paper seems to
signal increasing impatience in Beijing. Moreover, as James A. Kelly, president of the Pacific
Forum CSIS, has argued: “On balance, the policy paper is more about threats and lowering the
threshold at which violence might occur than about motivating Taiwan.”6 Indeed, President
Jiang Zemin has declared repeatedly that he intends to make reunification of the motherland
his own legacy. A resolution of the Taiwan issue would have to be brought about by the time
the 17th Communist Party Congress convenes in 2007, when Jiang Zemin will be 81 and retire
from the political scene.7
At the same time, the PLA - that has acquired an unprecedented potential for political
influence8 and might be the biggest winner from increased tension with Taipei9 - has been
asked to “prepare actively” for war with Taiwan. In an internal document sent by the Chinese
Communist Party’s Central Military Commission to all regional commanders, Beijing warns
of an “increased possibility for a military solution” should non-violent means fail to accelerate
the absorption of Taiwan. The document envisions a Blitzkrieg-like offensive with a first fatal
missile strike so that ”the Taiwan forces have no way to organise effective resistance.” From
the view of Beijing and the PLA’s point of view, any backlashes on this issue, such as the
proclamation in July 1999 by Taiwan’s (former) President Lee Teng-hui’s of a “two-country
theory” – fuels mainland China’s disintegration by encouraging independence for Tibet,
Xinkiang and other occupied areas. The White Paper also mentions that it is very unlikely that
European countries would come to Taiwan’s rescue, but anticipates an U.S. intervention to
defend Taiwan against an attack. Interestingly, the document is completely in line with the
PLA’s interest in “asymmetric strategies” to be used vis-à-vis the U.S. The PLA believes, for
example, that such a conflict will not escalate into a nuclear missile exchange, because the
U.S. will lose its will to fight and withdraw after suffering serious casualties, while the
Chinese side will be able to absorb heavy casualties and prevail.10 Therefore, China does not
need a real military balance with the U.S.
Although Beijing and Taiwan have engaged in a series of damage control measures since the
stunning victory (with a voter turnout of astonishing 82 percent) of the pro-independence
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential elections, the victory of Chen
Shui-Bian and the DPP in many ways marks a watershed in 5,000 years of Chinese and 400
years of Taiwan’s history. By breaking from the Kuomintang’s half century of power, the
island made its thirteen-year democratization process irreversible. For Beijing, this
development only heightens concerns that Taiwan has been drifting ever further away from
the mainland, and is headed towards formal independence. In a good-will gesture, President-
elect Chen Shui-bian ended a 51-year ban on direct trade, transport and postal links between
several small islands (Kinmen, Penghu and Matsu) and the mainland and eased restrictions on
foreign investors in Taiwan, including from China. Given the fact that the above-mentioned
 islands lack substantial infrastructure and industry, the abolition of the ban on direct links is
just a first step toward establishing such direct links across the Taiwan Strait.11 These
advances were also partly motivated by domestic considerations. Chen won with just 39
percent of the vote and therefore has no majority support in the parliament. Hence the new
government will need a few foreign policy successes to be able to resolutely fight the endemic
corruption (especially collusion between an asset-rich ruling Kuomintang party and local
politicians) left by the Kuomintang, to fairly allocate central-government funding, and to
break the links between organised crime and politics that have haunted the island for decades.
These domestic priorities can hardly be ignored by Beijing: the new president and his
government have but limited leeway for dealing with cross-Strait issues because they are
confronted with more urgent priorities and problems to be solved at home.
While Beijing’s government remained remarkably silent immediately after the Taiwanese
presidential elections, a PLA source threatened Taiwan to liberate it with a two-million-
soldier invasion force carried on 200,000 fishing boats, while adding a warning that nuclear
weapons were a viable option, particularly so if the U.S. interfered.12 Beijing’s supposed
interest to return to a more moderate policy can be explained by the fact that its failure to
threaten Taiwan into submission may have undermined the CPC’s domestic legitimacy
(Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, China has benefited considerably from business
links with Taiwan. More than 60,000 Taiwanese companies have been actively engaged on the
mainland and have invested some $44 billion there. Taiwan has thus become the third largest
investor for Beijing, and China the second-largest market for Taiwan exports. Two-way trade
rose to a record $25,8 billion last year, up 14,5 percent from 1998. Indirect trade between both
sides has reached $160 billion, 200,000 people from Taiwan live in mainland China and
another 16 million have travelled there since 1987.13 To some extent, this growing economic
interdependence confronts both sides with a dilemma as it affects and possibly constrains their
respective political options. The dilemma is asymmetric, however, in that it primarily affects
the weaker side, i.e. Taiwan.
Winning without Fighting
If present strategic trends continue, however, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait will be
eroded within the next decade.14 In recent years, the PLA has revised its strategy for a Taiwan
contingency.15 It now hopes to achieve its objectives “winning without fighting” a war, by
wreaking economic havoc and instigating social unrest in Taiwan. Hence, ”weapons” that
target the Taiwanese media, the stockmarket, and the islanders’ psychology have become an
important part of China’s military thinking on Taiwan and corresponding contingency
strategies. However, and depending on the island’s own policies and actions, gradual
escalation strategies might still involve missile tests, a sea blockade, combined-force drills
and a military build-up. Such strategies of attrition, based on a ”war of nerves” designed to
undermine the morale of the Taiwan population, could provide the PLA with the best chances
to succeed in a major conflict while at the same time preventing - simultaneously with a
number of deception techniques - a U.S. intervention.16 Whether these new military strategies
will succeed depends on many variables. But one outcome appears to be assured: ”Next times,
nerves in Taiwan may be more steeled.”17 Moreover, the missile tests in 1995/96 had been
quite successful. They escaped Taiwan’s early warning and detection radars18 and were much
more accurate than U.S. experts had previously expected.19 It underscored both the progress
the PLA has made in modernizing its missile force and specific military shortcomings on the
Taiwanese side which was unable to detect the missiles and thus could not have destroyed
 them. Only the US has sufficient signal intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities to detect such PRC
missiles in ”real time”. Furthermore, the July 1995 and March 1996 missile tests were
conducted in conjunction with broad multiservice exercises in which tactical ballistic missiles
are going to play an integral part of future combined arms operations of the PLA.20 It also
underlined one of the major lessons of the crisis ”that the PLA can challenge Taiwan’s vital
interests without direct engagement.”21 Unsurprisingly, the PLA has also drawn its more
painful lessons and will try to fare better next time. Furthermore, it has been 20 years ago
since Taiwan’s armed forces together with the US conducted joint military exercises. Thus the
degree of intra-operability - technical, doctrinal as well as operational - and experience of joint
military operations between the US and Taiwan’s armed forces is rather limited.
While the PLA lacks currently a credible invasion force and will continue to do so until at
least 2005, China has been rapidly increasing its short-range ballistic missile force in numbers
as well as in quality.22 At the moment, the PRC is deploying an advanced, longer-range
version of the DF-21, provisionally called DF-21X, with an extended range of 3,000kms and
an improved accuracy.23 Moreover, Beijing plans to launch six satellites before the end of the
year which will improve the accuracy of its ballistic missiles and will allow detailed
reconnaissance of Taiwan’s defence capabilities. At the same time, the PLA has made
considerable progress in developing manoeuvrable short-range ballistic missiles with ranges
between 300-600km and has been developing a new generation of land attack cruise missiles
to target accurately key Taiwanese military installations with the help of newly acquired dual-
use technologies such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Inertial Navigation
Guidance System (INS).24 These dual-use technologies are widely available on the civilian
market. In 1999, China deployed 150-200 M-11 (range 300km) and M-9 (range 600km) short-
range ballistic missiles in addition to 30-50 SRBMs deployed in 1995-96 in provinces
adjacent to the 175-km-wide Taiwan Strait – most of them presumably with improved
accuracy estimated to 20-30 metres by using GPS and INS minicomputers which are also
widely available on the civilian market as a typical dual-use product. Reportedly, Beijing
plans to increase that number to 650-800 missiles by the year 2005.25 This rearmament is at
least partially due to the fact that the PLA – in contrast to China’s Foreign Ministry and other
civilian ministries – continues to view the controversial missile tests of 1995 and 1996 as a
political victory.26 In few years’ time, the Chinese missile build-up could shift the balance of
deterrence in favour of mainland China and prompt Beijing to adopt more risk-taking policies
vis-à-vis Taiwan. In response to the increasing missile threat, Taiwan will deploy three
batteries with 200 Patriot missiles in northern Taiwan to protect the capital city and economic
centre. However, the former present no watershed shield against every incoming missile.27
Taiwan is therefore no longer interested in ballistic missile defence alone, but intends to
develop and deploy its own offensive ballistic missiles vis-à-vis mainland China (such as the
ballistic missile Tien-Ma with a range of 1,000km).28 Taipei’s current modernisation and
procurement efforts can be explained by the wish to buy time for the democratization on
mainland China rather than maintaining a real military balance.
While reunification of Taiwan is the overriding issue of Beijing’s policy, any unprovoked
missile attack or invasion of Taiwan would likely produce regional and global instabilities by
provoking: (1) increased U.S. military supplies to Taiwan or even a U.S. military intervention,
(2) Taiwan’s rejection of reunification and declaration of independence, (3) Japan’s rearming
and tightening of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance, and (4) China’s economic and political
isolation from the global economy and Western sources of investment.
 Thus far, Washington sticks to the political bargain struck with China in 1972: the U.S. will
maintain a “One-China” policy for as long as Beijing desists from solving the Taiwan problem
by other than peaceful means. It remains to be seen whether Beijing and Taipei will be able
and willing to adhere to the inherent principles. The foreign policy implications of Taiwan’s
remarkable democratization process are quite different from the situation when Washington
and Beijing agreed on their Shanghai compromise. Presently, nobody can be sure whether all
involved governments will ultimately be able to follow and to adopt to the new political
realities as they are or whether the new realities will have to adopt to “the old 1972
understanding” between Washington and Beijing. Given the changing political environment in
the region, the present situation can be viewed to some extent as being “unnatural”. Both the
U.S.’s and China’s credibility are very much at stake with regard to Taiwan. Whereas Beijing
has not rejected the original understanding, it has put greater emphasis on the “coercive”
aspect of diplomacy and has simultaneously deepened the classic security dilemma by
increasing its military arsenal vis-à-vis Taiwan in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The
present situation will not and cannot last forever. Beijing needs to at least meet Taipei and the
new political realities halfway in an effort to define and to find a new, more stable formula,
for both its relations with Taipei and Washington. Furthermore, the electoral victory of
Taiwan’s new president Chen Shui-bian has been the one outcome Beijing most feared and
had wanted to prevent. The PRC’s message that ”a vote for Chen is a vote for war” will make
it much more difficult for the future to seek and find a compromise with the newly installed
DPP government. Although Chen has proven his political farsightedness by ruling out holding
a referendum on independence in the near future, and in spite of his offer of new economic
ties and cooperation, Beijing and Jiang Zemin’s CPC, ultimately, can simply not trust him
over the longer term. And although Taiwan appears ready to enter negotiations for
reunification, it is simply not interested in the kind of outcome that Beijing is seeking.
Therefore, negotiations will only transfer both sides’ mutually exclusive interests to a higher
political level without resolving them. Given Beijing’s self-declared time-pressure to finalise
those negotiations for reunification by 2007, inherent pressure and conflicts can probably only
increase with every year the reunification is not emerging at the horizon. The next three to five
years are thus predicted by most U.S. experts, to become a period of heightened tensions and
potential crisis. Whether, as has been argued, there is a new “timetable without time limit”29,
remains to be seen in the forthcoming months and years. However, as Bates Gill recently
argued, any political strategy for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue must recognise the
core value of the democratic evolution on Taiwan: “... acknowledging it, nurturing it,
preserving it, and integrating its indisputable reality and dynamism into the ultimate
settlement of the cross-Straits quandary.”30
The Regional Code of Conduct for the South China Sea
“China’s claim to the South China Sea and its islets is so extreme that it is
sometimes difficult to take [it] seriously. But we in ASEAN should not
underestimate the firmness with which China is pursuing its designs on the
Spratlys. Nor should we underestimate the extent of domestic support for
Beijing’s chauvinistic foreign policy. We cannot discount the fact that China’s
increasing assertiveness in its foreign relations has wide support inside the
country. ...
 We need to speak to China with one voice in regards to the South China Sea.
China’s sweeping claim to the Spratlys is not just about barren islets, some of
which disappear at high tide. It is not just about fishing rights, marine resources,
or even the hydrocarbon reserves widely believed to lie under the shallow waters
of the South China Sea. It is about Southeast Asia’s security and survival.
The South China Sea ... flows into the most complex series of maritime crossroads
in the world. Just as the Mediterranean was the heartland of the classical
civilisations of Southern Europe, West Asia, and North Africa, this great inland
sea is Southeast Asia’s strategic heartland.”
(General Jose T. Almonte, former National Security Adviser and Director-General
of the National Security Council of the Philippines between 1992-98, in March
200031)
Although the ASEAN countries have increasingly arranged themselves with the PRC in the
post-Cold War period since 1992, the nature of ASEAN's relationship to China has remained
ambivalent32 and has had direct implications for ASEAN's relations with the other two major
powers in Asia-Pacific, namely Japan and the United States. Whereas ASEAN’s general
engagement policies vis-à-vis China have been guided by the economic perspective of a huge
Chinese market (in 1997, the World Bank has also rushed to conclusions that China's
economy will surpass the United States by 2020 in terms of total output and total purchasing
power33), Beijing’s ambiguous foreign and security policies have at the same time a major
concern for the region. Rapid modernization of China's armed forces (including its nuclear
arsenal)34, Beijing's territorial claims of almost the entire South China Sea, and its ”gunboat-
diplomacy” towards Taiwan have raised widespread concern over irredentist tendencies on
China's foreign and security agenda. The PRC’s policy of underpinning its territorial claims
with concrete political and military steps as well as the assertive nature of its Taiwan policy
that does not rule out the use of force for achieving political objectives have alarmed even
those segments of ASEAN’s political elites that have always favoured close relations with
China. At the same time, ASEAN states and China, all in a similar critical stage of political
and socio-economic transformation, have been competing in world markets over foreign trade
and investment.
Military Capabilities
In regard to the regional military balance, all Southeast Asian armed forces have only very
limited power projection capabilities despite their own military modernisation programmes by
incorporating high-tech weaponry and developing indigenous defence industries during the
last years. China’s armed forces as the “next superpower”, by contrast, are facing so far no
cuts due to the relative economic stability. As a consequence, the pace of China’s military
reforms and modernisation contributes to the security perception of a looming Chinese threat
that might come real for its neighbours much earlier than had previously been assumed.35
From an ASEAN point of view, China’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and the
way Beijing is pursuing its strategic goals – whether they be peaceful and benign or violent
and assertive  - are often being interpreted as a litmus test for ASEAN’s future relationship
with China and as a crucial factor for the preservation of regional stability in East Asia.
Whereas policies of ASEAN’s member states towards China have differed to some extent,
 there is a general consensus that ASEAN solidarity would require common opposition to any
use of force of the PRC.
During the Taiwan crisis from 1995-1996, and unimpressed by the presence of two U.S.
aircraft carrier battle groups, Beijing told the Seventh Fleet to keep out of the Taiwan Street,
which is about 180 kilometres (115 miles) across and separates Taiwan from China’s Fujian
Province. The PRC claimed the passage as ”Chinese waters”. Shortly after the Taiwan crisis,
on 15 May 1996, the Beijing government unveiled a new map which extends China’s
territorial claims in the South China Sea by over a million square miles – an expansion by
seven times of its maritime sovereignty. But free passage through sea lanes of communication
(SLOCs) such as the Taiwan Strait and shipping routes through the South China Sea are
important prerequisites for regional security that would have to be guaranteed by the U.S.
Navy in times of crisis. Washington has warned China that it will not accept any restrictions
to the freedom of movement of U.S. warships and military aircraft in the South China Sea.36
Other regional players such as Japan also have a strong interest in the stability of the area
because of their sensitivity to any disruption of commercial navigation. Although Japan has
renounced any claims over the Spratly Islands, it has vital security interest in open sea lanes
and thus in the status quo, because about 75 percent of its energy imports and much of its
merchant shipping passes through the South China Sea. Moreover, the involvement of
Japanese oil companies in the Spratlys represents another determining Japanese security
interest in the stability of the South China Sea.37 But Japan is not the only non-ASEAN-
country that has and should have a geostrategic interest in the freedom of SLOCs, given that
20 percent of the world’s oil consumption and more than 200 ships transit the Strait of
Malacca on any given day. In 1994, almost a trillion dollars worth of international trade,
including more than half of ASEAN’s trade, passed these sea lanes. Any uncontested
sovereignty over the Spratlys would involve, least, some sort of indirect control over the
shipping enroute to and from the Strait of Malacca.
According to the official PRC point of view as expressed in a 25 February 1992 ”Law of
the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea”, and in striking contrast with the stance
adopted by other claimants, there is no dispute because the respective islands have belonged
to China for centuries. When passing the law, China shocked both ASEAN and Japan by
actually including the Senkaku Islands and almost all elevations in the South China Sea into
its territorial waters without taking note of rival claims. The PRC has also stated that it would
defend its claims by military means as it did in 1988, when the PLA navy seized six Spratly
islands while sinking two Vietnamese military vessels. It was no coincidence that this new
assertiveness occurred shortly after the US had announced its withdrawal from the
Philippines. This, in turn, compelled ASEAN to make an unprecedented statement (the 1992
Manila Declaration on the South China Sea), urging the peaceful settlement of conflicting
territorial claims and the need to cooperate in order to ensure the safety of maritime navigation
and communication as well as other forms of security cooperation.38
Disregarding this appeal, China in early 1995 seized Mischief Reef about 150 miles west of
the Philippine island of Palawan. Subsequently, relations between Beijing and Manila
deteriorated and tensions increased with the arrests of Chinese fishermen and the destruction
of Chinese markers by the Philippines navy. And whereas Manila opted for negotiations on a
basis of international law, China did not consider itself bound by the Manila Declaration.
Indonesia‘s Claim
 Beijing‘s ”historical claims” and its militaristic policy towards Taiwan have also raised
mistrust in Jakarta. Indonesia had usually tried to accommodate China, but a PRC map
published in 1993 showed claims that included its natural gas-rich Natuna Islands. These
islands are surrounded by one of the world‘s largest offshore gas fields containing an
estimated 1.27 trillion cubic metres of recoverable gas – approximately 40 percent of
Indonesia’s total gas reserves.39 Some Indonesian security experts have since recommended
adopting a ”more realistic” China policy and getting tougher on Beijing. Jakarta subsequently
declared its intention to increase airforce patrols in the area and to encourage its citizens to
resettle on the Natuna Islands. Indonesia also quietly urged the US to strengthen its
engagement in the territorial dispute. In the summer of 1996, Jakarta launched its largest air,
land, and sea manoeuvres so far to demonstrate its determination to defend its sovereignty of
the islands.40 Proposed legislation was to expand the country’s sovereignty to some 5.8
million square kilometers of water and land.41 At the same time, a review of Indonesia‘s
maritime security resulted in the creation of a National Maritime Council charged with
devising policies on preservation and protection of the seas and the more than 17,000
Indonesian islands stretching along the Equator for 5,120 kilometers.
Given that the Indonesian navy remains a coastal defence force, Jakarta also felt compelled to
widen and deepen its security and defence ties with Australia and the US. Indonesia’s
territorial waters were opened more widely for the passage of foreign warships, including
submarines.42 The bilateral security agreement with Australia signed in December 1995
marked a substantial step away from Jakarta’s traditional policies of non-alignment with
important impacts on other outstanding security issues among both sides. Both countries were
subsequently alleged to have developed a strategy to defend the Natuna Islands against a
whole range of possible threats.43 Jakarta and Canberra also entered into negotiations on a
maritime boundary treaty that would bring almost three decades of tension and mutual distrust
to an end.44 Adjustments made in Indonesia’s security policies over the last four years thus
have strategic dimensions, going beyond national security policy, that have a considerable
impact on ASEAN’s relations with China and the other major powers in the region. Jakarta
had obviously come to realise that ASEAN thinking on security was not an adequate response
to long-term challenges like those Indonesia was facing in its maritime environment. China‘s
sovereignty claim has ultimately fastened the reconfiguration, in both conceptual and
operational terms, of the defence policies of Indonesia and other ASEAN states.45
The Philippine Claim
On 28 October 1998, aerial reconnaissance by the Philippine Air Force have shown that China
had recently completed new hardened structures on Mischief Reef, which is much closer to
the Philippines than it is to China. These structures included fortified three storey-buildings, a
new pier, an observation post, a military command centre, gun emplacements, and radar
facilities at four different sites. A helipad was still under construction. The reef was guarded
by Chinese naval ships and anti-aircraft artillery. The new facilities looked like fortifications,
similar to, but bigger than those China already had on Chigua and Fiery Cross reefs.46
According to most other Northeast and Southeast Asian states, this represented a clear
violation of the previously agreed-to preservation of the status quo. Beijing‘s irresponsible
and intimidating action has thus further undermined ASEAN’s proposals for confidence
building and regional security in the frameworks of ARF and CSCAP activities.
 In response, the Philippine armed forces, comprising the weakest navy and air force in
Southeast Asia, was ordered by President Joseph Estrada to boost its presence in the area with
the deployment of additional vessels and reconnaissance aircraft. A major deployment of
Philippine marines to Palawan and the Spratlys was reportedly under preparation.47 Moreover,
the Philippines navy detained 20 Chinese fishermen in the vicinity of Mischief Reef.
Thereupon, Beijing warned Manila not to escalate the existing state of tension and to release
the fishermen and six impounded vessels. On the occasion, the PRC reaffirmed its
”indisputable sovereignty over the islands and the seas around them.”48 Unable to confront
China militarily and to make any difference except by continuing to talk with the Chinese side
and trying to get international public opinion behind it, Estrada pushed the January 1998 VFA
with the US through ratification. The agreement provides for joint large-scale exercises
between US and Philippine forces on Philippine soil and in the region.49 Although China
subsequently promised not to build any new structures in the Spratly islands, more renovation
work as the Chinese side called it cannot be ruled out in the light of previous experiences.
Although China has repeatedly offered ”joint development, including fisheries development
and exploitation on an equal sharing basis,”50 realisation of such proposals remains dependent
upon the readiness of the Philippine side to accept China’s territorial sovereignty over the
Spratly Islands. In the meantime, other regional countries have practised resource sharing in
areas of overlapping claims to their mutual benefit.
For the Philippines, it is even more discomforting that ASEAN partners such as Malaysia and
Vietnam have been following unilateral strategies which risk undermining ASEAN’s political
cohesion. Malaysia’s recently built infrastructure, for instance, for the purpose of ”scientific
studies on fisheries and the deep sea” on the Investigator (Peninjau) and Erica (Sipit) reefs in
the Spratly island chain, which are equipped with a radar antenna and a helicopter landing
pad, has provoked strong protests in both Beijing and Manila and has thus further undermined
a common ASEAN position vis-à-vis China. Taiwan, by contrast, in November 1999 said it
would exchange its marines on the Pratas (Tungsha) and Spratly (Nansha) islands as well as
on two other major front-line islands groups in the Taiwan Strait (Kinmen and Matsu) for
coast guards.51 In February 2000, the actual control of Pratas and Taiping was shifted from
the defence ministry to the Coast Guard Administration (CGA).
Feeling betrayed by China and by its own ASEAN partners,52 the Philippines saw no other
alternative than strengthening their defence cooperation with the US and resumed large-scale
joint military exercises with Washington.53 In the meantime, President Estrada sought the help
of Filipino-Chinese businessmen to find a modus vivendi with China and even suggested
holding sports competitions among all claimants on one of the Spratly Islands, but this ”soccer
diplomacy” and bilateral contacts with China only resulted in a ”dialogue of the deaf”. On the
one hand, Beijing in 1999 repeatedly promised self-restraint, on the other, the PRC repeatedly
rejected Philippine demands for a commitment not to build new structures. Beijing also
refused to tear down the newly-built infrastructure on Mischief Reef.
Meanwhile, the Philippine’s 15-year military modernisation programme remains a subject
of ongoing dispute due to a lack of funds and complex bureaucratic procedures. President
Estrada has relaunched the programme with an initial investment of only six billion pesos
(US$ 157.9 million). Nonetheless, Manila is considering acquiring Perry-class and Knox-class
frigates in the framework of transfers on a grant basis of excess military equipment from the
US. The frigates in question would be the largest ships ever deployed by the Philippines
navy.54
China, however, may still believe it is able to achieve its objectives over time without
resorting to massive confrontation with neighbouring claimant states. Beijing’s present rather
 contradictory policies and actions in the South China Sea follow a traditional ”divide and
conquer” strategy, and are fully in line with its strategic culture and notions of war and
diplomacy.55
Vietnam’s Claim
In early 1997, Beijing raised the stakes again by conducting an oil and gas exploration drill off
central Vietnam in waters claimed by Hanoi. Since the beginning of the ”asymmetrical
normalisation process” between Vietnam and China in 1991, China has violated Vietnamese
territorial waters at least nine times.56 But contrasting with the years of Vietnam’s regional
isolation, Chinese tactics this time backfired. Vietnam received significant political and
diplomatic support by its fellow ASEAN members and even discussed a future military
relationship with the US – a nightmare for PRC strategists fearing US containment. According
to a comment made by an ASEAN-diplomat at the time: ”Automatically ASEAN will support
Vietnam. It’s all for one and one for all.”57 However, ASEAN countries subsequently agreed
to Beijing’s insistence on bilateral negotiations to solve territorial disputes. On the other hand,
they were rather suspicious as far as China’s offer for ”joint development” of disputed areas
was concerned, viewing it ”less as a genuinely conciliatory suggestion and more as a Chinese
ploy to gain a foothold in areas claimed by the People’s Republic” as Tim Huxley has
argued.58
The Position of the United States
Whether the US would want to incur such a risk for a few uninhabited islands in the South
China Sea is indeed the crucial question for ASEAN security experts. Prior to the outbreak of
East Asia’s financial crisis in 1997, ASEAN defence policies and military doctrines were
increasingly based on such a scenario which in turn determined acquisitions of state-of-the-art
weapons systems.59
Although China had verbally agreed not to change the status quo in the South China Sea
through unilateral steps and to seek a peaceful solution through negotiations, the PRC has
continued to test the political will of Vietnam and the Philippines as well as their support
within ASEAN. In August 1995, Beijing and Manila agreed on a code of conduct to prevent
any direct confrontation over the Spratly islands60 which was signed in November.61 New
multilateral security discussions and confidence building measures initiated since 1994 in the
framework of ARF and CSCAP notwithstanding, China has not given up its claims to almost
the entire South China Sea.
Moreover, despite signs of solidarity emerging within ASEAN when China tested its
political will in 1995 and 1997, Beijing‘s efforts to pursue its strategy ”at limiting alliances
forming against it have been remarkably successful, particularly during the period they needed
this success most: in establishing a physical presence in the Spratlys and gaining some
recognition of the legitimacy of China’s sovereignty.”62 And indeed, China has rather
successfully frustrated the attempts made by some ASEAN countries to internationalise the
dispute, insisting on exclusively bilateral negotiations which provide the PRC with
considerable strategic leeway vis-à-vis its much weaker opponents.
 A Creeping Occupation?
Even more important for Beijing’s strategy of ”calculated ambiguity” was the timing of
China’s renewed aggressiveness.63 Already in the past, China had consistently moved to
reinforce its maritime claims towards others at times when the latter were weakened. Many
regional observers have interpreted this behaviour as another indicator for the extent to which
the balance of power and influence has shifted in China’s favour since the onset of the
region’s economic crisis which weakened ASEAN economically, militarily, and politically.
Furthermore, construction activities on Mischief Reef were resumed shortly before the annual
APEC conference on 17 November 1998, during which China pledged funding for ailing
Asian economies, and ASEAN‘s December summit in Hanoi. Therefore, and with public
attention focused on the severe socio-economic and political crisis at home, the Philippines,
unlike in 1995 and 1997, this time were unable to mobilise strong political support of its
ASEAN partners. Once again, China’s provocative policy in the Spratly Islands thus revealed
the increasingly asymmetric power relations between China and the five other claimant states.
Contrasting with the Diaoyu(tai)/Senkaku Islands dispute with Japan, rival claimants to the
Spratly Islands have much less economic leverage over China that could constrain Beijing’s
assertive policies of ”creeping occupation”. The result has been opportunistic and sometimes
aggressive Chinese behaviour64, pattern that re-emerged in early 1998 when China built
satellite relay stations on a group of islands over which Vietnam also claims sovereignty. 65
Decreasing ASEAN solidarity could even more than China’s provocative behaviour have
significant long-term security implications for the Association and regional stability.
Kowtowing to China’s increasing assertiveness risks encouraging more dangerous behaviour.
ASEAN’s Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino stated in late 1998: ”We have bigger problems
to deal with, particularly the economy.”66 As Ralph A. Cossa has concluded: ”The message to
China is that further expansion will not be seriously protested, much less contested. This is a
recipe for potential disaster.”67 Indeed, in a context of ”crisis management” and ”preventive
diplomacy”, ASEAN’s failure to confront China might increase rather than decrease prospects
for further miscalculation on both sides. In this regard, China’s ongoing provocative
behaviour and future Philippine or Vietnamese counter- and overreactions constitute an
”accident waiting to happen” that might trigger an otherwise unintended escalation. This trend
is further reinforced by increases in competing commercial and military activities and the easy
availability of new military hardware, as well as China‘s lack of recognition of the risks
resulting from a unilateral ”creeping occupation” that changes the status quo in the region. An
unexplained 1996 clash between the Philippines navy and suspected Chinese gunboats 120
kms northwest of Manila, for instance, is just one example of such inadvertent naval
confrontations.
Sovereignty and Globalisation
In this context, it is important to understand that it is not only the Chinese notion of
territorial sovereignty that appears outdated in an era of globalisation. Even political reformers
and dissidents have defended China’s ”national interest” in the South China Sea and its
territorial claims as a ”sacred duty.”68 In their view, China’s territorial claims are basically
”non-negotiable” and the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy and tool of coercion
to achieve political objectives in the South China Sea cannot be excluded.69 At the same time,
Beijing remains opposed to submitting any claims to the International Court of Justice or the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as demanded by the Philippines and other
ASEAN countries.70
 In this context, it is important to note that the Chinese understanding of territorial sovereignty
is not only antiquated in the era of globalisation in regard to official positions of the Chinese
government. Even political reformers and dissidents have defended China’s “national
interests” in the South China Sea and its territorial claims as a “sacred duty”. In their view,
China’s territorial claims are ultimately “non-negotiable” and often even the use of force as an
instrument of foreign policy and tool of coercion to achieve political objectives in the South
China Sea cannot be excluded. A the same time, Beijing remains opposed to submitting any
claims to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
as the Philippines and other ASEAN states have called for.
Until today, China has mostly succeeded in isolating the Philippines by cultivating closer
economic and political relations with other ASEAN countries. But since summer 1999, the
Philippines and other ASEAN states have tried to manage territorial conflicts in the South
China by drafting an ASEAN code of conduct as a CBM and by exercising ”self-restraint and
refrain from unilateral actions” that might increase tensions. Manila had hoped that the code
would deter China from building more structures in other parts of the disputed island chain.
Even more important was the expectation that the code of conduct would restore ASEAN
unity in dealing with sovereignty and maritime disputes in the South China Sea, thus
strengthening ASEAN’s collective leverage to constrain China’s ”creeping assertiveness” in
the area. During the first half of 1999, the idea was discussed and endorsed in both ”track
one” (ASEAN summit, AMM and ARF) as well as ”track two” (CSCAP, Workshop on
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea) meetings. In August 1999, the Philip-
pines presented a draft code on behalf of ASEAN; Beijing came out with its own version in
October. Both drafts were discussed at the ASEAN-China meeting held in Manila in
November 1999. On that occasion, the PRC refused to consider the Philippines draft but
agreed to hold further discussions. Unlike the ASEAN document, the Chinese version did not
contain an appeal to claimants to refrain from settling or erecting structures on presently
uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features in the disputed area. Both China
and Malaysia then tried to delay procedures by arguing against a ”hasty drafting” of the
document and by insisting that they required a bilateral code of conduct.71 Moreover, the PRC
has made its signature contingent on the acceptance of three proposed CBMs: (1) notification
of any joint military exercises held in disputed areas (where Beijing does not risk having to
reciprocate), (2) attendance by Chinese officials as observers at joint exercises, and (3)
humane treatment for arrested fishermen. Ultimately, however, China is determined to see an
end to any joint military exercises and military operations around the Spratly Islands and thus
to prevent any US interference in this or other bilateral conflicts in the region.72 Furthermore,
Taiwan as one of the claimants and an important financial contributor to many co-operative
projects, following PRC pressure, has not been invited to participate in the formulation of the
code of conduct. This omission is shortsighted and counterproductive for all other claimant
states, because it leaves Taipei with much room for manoeuvring in its future activities in the
South China Sea.‘73
Moreover, ASEAN agreed to two major revisions to the Philippine draft. First, the definition
of disputed areas was adjusted to comprise of both the Spratlys and the Paracel Islands, as
Hanoi‘s dispute with China covered both archipelagos. China, by contrast insists that the code
should be applied only to the Spratly Islands. Secondly, exploration and exploitation of
resources in disputed areas was deleted from the list of potential areas of cooperation.74 It is
not only China, but also Vietnam and the Philippines who remain reluctant to enter into any
joint development projects before territorial disputes are resolved. In the meantime, more
discussion is required to finalize the text. Once adopted, such a code could help to build trust,
enhance cooperation, and reduce tension in the Spratlys. However, it would be naive and
 unrealistic to believe that it would contribute to resolving territorial disputes in the South
China Sea. In the past, China has signed bilateral codes of conduct with the Philippines
(August 1995) and Vietnam (November 1995), without abiding by the very principles spelled
out in these agreements. Neither the above-mentioned codes nor Beijing’s signing of the UN
Charter of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in April 1996 have deterred the PRC from
extending the structures it had previously built on disputed islands in the South China Sea.
Furthermore, agreements such as the newly-proposed regional code of conduct are
declarations of intent rather than legally binding instruments which oblige legally contracting
parties to abide by the terms provided in the treaty.
As long as ASEAN shies away from collectively confronting China as had been the case in
1995 and 1997, Beijing will hardly feel prompted to halt its creeping assertiveness” in the
South China Sea.75 Significantly, the PRC has also offered to sign the protocol to the
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) – provided that it does not
cover Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelves in the Asia-Pacific region.
During the first months of 2000, the situation has not improved significantly. Chinese
fishing vessels are still fishing in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, and Chinese aircraft have
been spotted flying over the Philippines’ territorial waters. This has resulted in new Philippine
attempts to force PRC fishing boats to leave and in new diplomatic protest by Manila.76
Against this background, the US attempt to stay neutral for as long as the freedom of
navigation is guaranteed and SLOCs remain open and to otherwise adhere to an excessively
legalistic interpretation has provided China with opportunities to skilfully advance its
”creeping assertiveness” by playing on legal ambiguities reinforced by US policies. In the
meantime, certain experts and policy circles in Washington have become more concerned
about the present situation.77 Obviously, future US policies towards the South China Sea
remain critical for stability in the entire Southeast Asian region.
A Shifting Balance of Power?
Despite the fact that the U.S. has retained the strategic balance of military power by
maintaining 100.000 troops in the Asia-Pacific region as evidence of its commitment, human
right concerns, a new “donorgate” scandal and other domestic issues in the U.S. Congress as
well as the Western policies to punish Burma seemed to have driven the Southeast Asian
states closer to China and Japan at the end of 1997.78 Washington’s rather muted response to
the currency and financial crisis in Southeast Asia has sowed new suspicions and fuelled
conspiracy theories and anew anti-American sentiment in the region. It was particularly the
slow speed of the U.S. response to the crisis (which had far-reaching impacts on Southeast
Asian domestic and foreign policies, as well as the political instability in Indonesia with
dangers of a ”Balkanisation” and the re-emergence of traditional conflicts between ASEAN
member states such as between Malaysia and Singapore) that made it possible for China to
strengthen its influence at the expense of the U.S and as a counterweight to the U.S.-Japanese
security alliance. Compared with other regional players, China, by contrast, appeared to be
relatively stable in both political and economical terms. Moreover, Beijing had launched a
diplomatic campaign to fashion a modern version of the Middle Kingdom in the region. It
included a $1 billion aid-programme to the IMF-led rescue plan for Thailand and Indonesia.79
In sum, it looked as though the strategic balance of political influence had increasingly tipped
in favour of China which was trying to capitalize on ASEAN’s weakness and Japan’s lack of
 leadership as well as its inability to abandon its “virtual crisis response policies” in Southeast
Asia.80
At the beginning of the crisis, Japan had appeared to be a more promising economic ally.
Later, however, and a US$ 30 billion rescue plan for Southeast Asia notwithstanding, Tokyo’s
bureaucratic and political elites showed serious weaknesses in dealing with their own home-
made crisis.81 Given the lack of Japanese leadership and Washington‘s initially slow response
to the financial and economic crisis as well as its inability to communicate without raising
suspicions, it looked as though economic woes were compelling Asia-Pacific countries to
forge closer relations with China. One indicator for such a strategic shift was the so-called
”imperial intrigue” between Malaysia‘s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed and China’s
Premier Li Peng that transpired on the occasion of the first annual East Asian (ASEAN-plus-
three) summit meeting in December 1997. Furthermore, from an American point of view,
China and ASEAN were trying to foster a sense of unity by excluding the US. 82
Whereas all claimants to territories in the South China Sea have stated their preference for
peaceful solutions and negotiations, China appears to have kept the military option open.
Arguments put forward by Western experts that occupied islands can not be defended by the
PLA presently83 overlook the fact that China is a growing nuclear power and that ASEAN
countries as well as Japan, Taiwan, and others lack sufficient amphibious forces to recuperate
occupied islands. Only the US has sufficient and effective amphibious capacities to perform
such a task in the South China Sea. But making use of the military option would constitute a
high risk game for Washington, too. Reliance on aircraft carriers and Aegis-equipped surface
escort ships, for instance, would be inadequate if not dangerous in littoral conflicts in the
Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea.84 Ultimately, what matters in this respect are security
perceptions and expectations rather than objective strengths and weaknesses of claimant
countries. Military history, including that of China, has abundant examples of weaker forces
defeating much stronger rivals. Circumstances, motivation, and a superior strategy have often
been more important than numbers.
In reality, however, neither Japan nor China have replaced the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region
as a stabilising force, principal balancer, and “benign hegemon”, nor will they do so in the
foreseeable future. China has certainly the political will to take over this role, but it still lacks
the economic power to assume Japan’s role of an economic leader. The Japanese economy is
six times that of China and accounts for more than 70 percent of total East Asian economic
output and purchasing power. Moreover, Tokyo contributed $80 billion altogether towards
coping with the Asian financial crisis whereas China provided only 1 billion.85 Meanwhile,
China itself has been infected by the regional crisis, albeit in rather different ways. China is
confronted with a looming financial and banking crisis in the short-term future and a
potentially more severe socio-economic destabilisation as well as a domestic political crisis in
the mid-term perspective due to the current transformation and reform policies of its economic
and political system undermining the communist ideology and the legitimisation of the
political regime. Over the next few years, Beijing will be facing unprecedented socio-
economic challenges that could severely impact on the stability of the PRC’s political system
(i.e. widespread corruption or the spread of religious-based movements such as Falun Gong or
Zhong Gong). China is also suffering from widespread unemployment with 100-130 million
people (about the size of the population of Japan) which is bound to further increase in the
next years. Whereas corruption has become endemic, economic progress has been
increasingly uneven among southeastern provinces on the one hand and interior rural areas on
the other hand. Combined with recent protectionist trends, slower growth in export markets,
lower product prices and increasing competition from Latin America, pressures to devalue the
 renminbi and to subsidise its exports could increase - a development that ultimately threatens
China’s WTO accession.86 It could also result in Chinese efforts to take market share away
from its Southeast Asian neighbours, which in turn would lead to new economic and political
conflicts between Beijing and ASEAN. At the same time, China’s self-image of a new Middle
Kingdom as an “unsatisfied power” provides a striking contrast with the economic and
military realities as an “incomplete great power”.87 Some Chinese economist experts have
already concluded that “China has turned from a regional stabiliser to a regional risk factor”.88
But regional foreign policies are considerably driven by perceptions. And here one can
identify a perceptional gap existing in East Asia between the objective assessment of China’s
political, economic and military prowess on the one hand and perceptions of a PRC rising to
dominant power status on the other. Even those Asian experts who have concluded that the
U.S. rather than China is the political “winner” of the present East Asian financial and
economic crisis ask for how long that state of affairs can be maintained before Beijing
replaces Washington.
And yet, criticism directed at the U.S. and the West in general by some ASEAN states after
the outbreak the currency and financial crisis in the summer of 1997 was often very
ambivalent and largely unconvincing. When outside help was offered, it was initially turned
down because it did not represent an “Asian solution to Asian problems”. As Gerald Segal has
criticized: “Many of the Southeast Asians who used to deride the Americans and Europeans as
powers in decline now complain that Westerners are not doing enough to assist them. ... The
moaners in Southeast Asia are the most infuriating - the biggest free-riders on American
deterrence of China and defence of the global economy, and yet the quickest to carp.”89
Furthermore, the Malaysian security expert Joon Num Mak has reminded the ASEAN states
that “the ‘ASEAN way’ was effective in managing sub-regional tensions only because there
was a security umbrella provided by the USA which looked after the main external threats to
the region”.90 Thus the criticism made by some of the ASEAN states provided a striking
contrast to the central economic and political role the U.S. played in the framework of
international organisations for working out specific rescue plans for the ASEAN states.
Furthermore, in the security field, the U.S. as a ”status quo power” has expanded its military-
to-military co-operation not only with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan but also with ASEAN
countries such as Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Maintaining the forward presence
of the U.S. armed forces in the Asia-Pacific has been facilitated by activities such as port
calls, repair, joint training and logistical support.91 In sum, Southeast Asia’s economic,
political and military-strategic dependence on the U.S. has increased rather than declined as a
result of the multiple crisis affecting the region.
While ASEAN has been very successful in developing informal approaches of co-operation
and in avoiding conflicts, it has also been able to increase its political and economic leverage
over the last ten years despite its inherent diversity and due to its remarkable economic growth
and its increasing intra-political and economic cooperation. Nonetheless, external factors will
continue to considerably influence the stability and future prosperity of the ASEAN-states.
Therefore, the amount of political leverage the ASEAN countries have to enable them to
organize a peaceful change within member countries and the entire region also depends on the
preservation of stable and peaceful relations within the triangular relationship of the United
States, China and Japan. However, both the crisis and ASEAN’s inability to build an alliance
to defend members’ territorial claims against China have undermined the political cohesion of
the Association and thus weakened its leverage vis-à-vis Beijing.
 Some sympathy with China’s opposition to US pressure notwithstanding, ASEAN has always
been careful not to openly side with the PRC in calling for a withdrawal of US forces from
East Asia. If it agrees with China’s project to build a multipolar world, then it is for different
reasons. Several ASEAN countries have held joint exercises with the US and have allowed the
7th Fleet to use their repair and other facilities. Bilateral defence arrangements of individual
ASEAN members with external powers such as the UK, Australia, and the US have been
strengthened in recent years because of perceived Chinese hegemonial ambitions. However,
each ASEAN country takes a different attitude towards China’s attempts to assume a
dominant or hegemonial role. Moreover, important as ASEAN’s ”constructive engagement”
policies towards China may be, the development of Beijing’s policies in the region primarily
depend on the evolution of PRC domestic politics, over which China’s neighbours have little
or no direct influence.
The strategic value of the South China Sea results for all neighbouring countries not only from
assumed rich resources like oil, gas, minerals and fisheries but equally from the open and free
movement of the major international shipping lanes in the South China Sea which are
particularly essential for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Nearly a quarter of the
world’s ocean freight and over half of the world’s merchant fleet capacity passes through the
South China Sea and the major Southeast Asian chokepoints such as the Straits of Malacca,
Sunda, and Lombok.92 The signing of the 1982 UN Convention of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the
spectacular economic growth and regional trade have reinforced the importance of the
archipelagic sea-lanes in East Asia. The Malacca-Strait, the alternative Sunda and Lombok
passageways and the sea-lanes around the Spratly islands are now recognised as being among
the most critical choke-points, which are of vital security concern to virtually all states in
South- and Northeast Asia. Any unilateral control of the maritime area and the major shipping
lanes or any mining of those maritime choke points93 have widespread economic and military
implications as it was the case during World War II when Japan used the Spratly islands as a
military springboard for the invasion of the Philippines, Malaysia (formerly Malaya) and
Indonesia (at that time, Dutch East Indies). The only real political solution seems to be a joint
development of the potential oil and gas deposits. Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Australia, Japan and South Korea have already chosen this approach for their mutual benefit.
China as the main player and perceived potential hegemon, however, has so far not really
offered the willingness for a joint development of disputed areas in the South China Sea
despite all verbal assurances for a peaceful settlement of disputes. Beijing’s willingness for a
joint development remains dependent on the acceptance of China’s sovereignty over the
Spratly islands and almost the entire South China Sea as Chinese ”internal waters”.
Whereas China is perceived by all ASEAN countries, albeit to different extents, as the major
potential long-term threat to regional stability, Japan is being viewed in more positive terms at
least for as long as Tokyo does not totally dominate regional economies, accepts partners as
equals, and does not unilaterally extend its military role to Southeast Asia. Also whereas the
PRC‘s power has been growing and ASEAN has occasionally made use of Japan as a
countervailing power to China’s military might, Tokyo itself has been eager to enhance
cooperation and dialogue with ASEAN. However, Members‘ cautious response to the 1997
”Hashimoto-doctrine” indicated that a more prominent Japanese role in the security of the
region would be the result of domestic developments and US support rather than of attitudes
taken by neighbouring countries. Given Japan’s domestic and external constraints to assume
such a role anytime soon, Tokyo‘s political options as a ”constrained power” in dealing with
volatile and politically charged challenges remain limited by a combination of domestic and
external factors. Therefore, Japan’s government would require a strong political will to accept
new security obligations and to initiate a broader and open security debate with its own public
 so as to give new directions to its foreign and security policies. As has been the case with
ASEAN’s relation with China, the relationships and attitudes of ASEAN members vis-à-vis
Japan have differed somewhat, including specifically the question whether and to what extent
Tokyo should shoulder more regional and international obligations in the field of security.
Although there is recognition in ASEAN of Japan’s important contribution to the region’s
economic growth and political stability, views of a larger Japanese political and security role
remain largely ambivalent.
Nonetheless, by its own standards, Japan is in the midst of a “revolution” in terms of its future
regional security and defence policies. In February 2000, the Japanese foreign ministry
announced that Tokyo would be willing to contribute armed coastguard vessels to
multinational anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits.94 Japan has thus interpreted its
constitutional notion of “self-defence” as including waters more than 2,000 miles away from
Tokyo. The steady extension of the defence perimeter mirrors the strategic importance of
SLOCs and the South China Sea for the economic survival of Japan as well as the increasing
strategic and geopolitical rivalry with China in East Asia and beyond. The October 1999 hi-
jacking of a large Japanese vessel by pirates and increasing economic and political instability
in Indonesia have underscored the need for outside assistance to cope with the threat of piracy
in the region. To counter historical anti-Japanese sentiments and mistrust in Southeast Asia,
Japan will dispatch less-conspicuous, civilian-controlled coastguard vessels of its Maritime
Safety Agency instead of regular military vessels of its Self-Defence Forces. Contrasting with
past practice, several Southeast Asian governments have accepted the offer, thus also
signalling a concern with maintaining the regional balance of powers. India, too, appears
determined to counterbalance China‘s increasing influence and has established an informal
but deepening security-cooperation with Japan and Vietnam.95
Tokyo‘s ongoing search for a future role in the region, presently reflected in an unprecedented
debate over the possible revision of the anti-militaristic and pacifistic Article 9 of the Japanese
Constitution96, is a sign that Japan has been slowly coming to grips with a reality it used to
deny: ”It (Japan) is a great power with strategic interests as pressing as its economic ones.” 97
Given lingering mistrust in the region as well as fears that a more proactive Japanese role
could complicate ASEAN’s relations with China, Tokyo can only assume more responsibility
by maintaining its alliance with Washington and abstaining from unilateral approaches. Even
then, Japan‘s role will increase and evolve only gradually and incrementally. Nonetheless,
Japanese experts have indicated that possible future security assistance might include the
transfer of military equipment and technologies to ASEAN countries, as well as the training of
ASEAN military personnel and development of close bi- and multilateral security
consultations98, projects that are not altogether new.
Against this background, and given China’s suspicion of a redefined US-Japan alliance,
Washington and Tokyo need to demonstrate that their pact aims to preserve regional peace
and stability rather than contain the PRC. In this respect, and considering Japan’s repeated
efforts to involve Beijing in closer bi- and multilateral security dialogues, ASEAN can play a
useful role in reassuring China that the re-definition of the alliance is in the interest of the
entire region and not specifically directed against China. Beijing, in turn, has to recognise that
disputes with Taiwan are an internal matter only as long as they do not turn violent and affect
the security interests of other neighbouring countries.
Ultimately, however, regional stability will depend on a strong and sustained US
engagement, including the maintenance of substantial political, economic, and military means
as well as stability in the Japan-China-US triangle at a time when all three operate from
positions of relative strength. China’s future internal stability and the direction of its foreign
 policies as well as ASEAN‘s political coherence (particularly following admission of Laos,
Myanmar, and Cambodia) will largely determine to what extent the Association will be able
to raise its voice in the region and on the global level. The more China follows an assertive or
even aggressive policy as it has in the South China Sea, the more ASEAN’s relations with
third parties, namely the US and Japan, will again assume a greater importance. And the more
ASEAN becomes dependent on these two powers, the more it will ultimately obstruct or
reduce its own independent influence in the region and beyond. In such circumstances, the
Japan-China-US triangle would acquire even greater importance for the stability of the entire
Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, Washington‘s bilateral alliances, supplemented by multilateral
security structures such as ARF, CSCAP, and other “track-two” activities, will remain the
bedrock of regional stability, particularly so during times of socio-economic and political
transition and the rise of  China to a potentially unprecedented economic, political, and
military power in the region.99 In this context, the US-Japan alliance will remain the linchpin
of ASEAN’s stability; Japan’s security in general; and preservation, for the time being, of
Japan’s, South Korea’s and Taiwan’s non-nuclear weapon status.100
Against this background, Europe should ask herself whether it makes sense to continue a
traditional foreign policy vis-à-vis the Asia-Pacific region that is almost exclusively defined
by economic interests. This would run counter to the EU's “Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP)” and strategic security interests in the region and worldwide. In this context,
Europe still has to recognise that instability or armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, in the
Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea will both directly and indirectly affect European
and global security and stability. Therefore, it is time to define Europe’s strategic and security
interests in the region as going beyond the present limited functional involvement in support
of KEDO and multilateral “track one” and “track two” security meetings such as ARF and
CSCAP.
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